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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

Contracts-Effect of Merger Clause on
Fraud by Agent
Action for purchase price of furnace which defendant had contracted to buy. Petitioner's agent had induced defendant to enter
into a contract which was subject to acceptance by the home office
and which contract contained a merger clause. 1 Buyer, in his answer,
alleged fraudulent statements made by agent concerning the condition of buyer's old furnace. On appeal Held: Plaintiff's motion
for judgment on the pleadings sustained in that answer did not set
up a defense to the petition since defendant was precluded from
repudiating the merger clause.2
The same court, in a decision handed down the same day, held
tract by fraudulent material misrepresentations of an agent.3 Thus,
the court, in the present case, recognized the power of the merger
clause to prevent actions of rescission or defenses based on fraud
of an agent.
The merger clause involved in the subject case extended only to
understandings, agreements, and warranties. Other clauses are
broader, encompassing representations and inducements. 4 The
courts of this country have given varying effect to these clauses as
a result of differing interpretations and not due to the substantive
differences in the provisions of the clauses. A minority of courts,
as in the principal case here, have held the clause prevents any
action or defense based on any representations or agreements not
in the written contract.5 Other courts have held that the clause is
no more than a stipulation of the parol evidence rule, 6 and have
treated the defenses in light of that rule only. The majority of
courts have felt that to give full effect to the clause is too harsh, but
have afforded some consequence to it. Distinctions have been drawn
1 "This Contract Contains the Entire Agreement Between the Parties.
Verbal Understandings and Agreements with Representatives Shall Not Bind
the Seller Unless Set Forth Herein. There are No Warranties, Express or
Implied, Other Than Those Herein Stated."
2 Holland Furnace Co. v. Williams, 179 Kan. 321, 295 P.2d 672 (1956).
3 George v. Kohlasch, 179 Kan. 337, 295 P.2d 655 (1956).
4 "It is understood and agreed that this contract contains all the covenants
... ; that the same [property] is and has been purchased by the purchaser
as a result of said inspection and not upon representations made by . . .
selling agent . . . and the sellers will not be responsible for or liable on
account of any inducements, promises, representation, or agreements not
set forth herein." Speck v. Wylie, 1 Cal.2d 625, 36 P.2d 618 (1934).
°Colt Co. v. Odom, 136 Miss. 651, 101 So. 853 (1924); see Annot., 75
A.L.R. 1046 (1931), 133 A.L.R. 1349 (1941); notes 22 Corn. L.Q. 102 (193637), 35 Ia. L. Rev. 105 (1949).
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between fraud as to the terms of the contract and fraud in the
inducement, 7 evidence being held inadmissable as to the former and
admissable as to the latter. Another view holds that the clause relieves the principal of liability for deceit, but permits the buyer
the option to revoke. 8 A situation similar to the principal case has
not arisen in Nebraska, but it has been held that the merger clause
gives notice of the scope of the authority of the agent and evidence
showing fraud within that scope has been held admissable.9
The variety of holdings have resulted from a variety of valid
policy reasons. But an examination of these reasons reveals that
they are not contradictory.
A consideration of the principal's purpose in using the merger
clause throws light on the problem and offers a possible solution.
The purpose may be considered two-fold; (1) to ascertain the obligation and to limit the agent in adding to or varying such, and (2)
to protect the principal from unauthorized acts of his agents. The
first purpose is met by the parol evidence rule, but in addition the
clause shows the intent of the parties to integrate their agreements
in writing and gives notice of the agent's lack of authority to add
to or vary a proposed contract. 10 The second can be met without
loss to the buyer by permitting to him the option to revoke while
relieving the principal of liability for deceit.11 The principal should
be allowed to protect himself against unauthorized acts, yet he
should not be allowed to benefit from them.12
This above interpretation provides a warning to the buyer of
the limited authority of the agent and the limited obligation of
the principal. To refuse recission would allow a multitude of frauds
to be protected by some exculpatory clause. In the principal case,
6 Johns-Manvill Corp. v. Heckart, 129 Or. 505, 277 P. 821 (1921); see Vold,
Sales, § 151 (1931); 9 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2439 (3d ed. 1940); 3 Williston,
Contracts, § 811-A (Rev. ed. 1936).
7 Rock Island Implement Co. v. Wally, 268 S.W. 904 (Mo. App. 1925);
Plate v. Detroit Fidelity & S. Co., 229 Mich 482, 201 N.W. 457 (1924); Cf.
Colonial Development Corp. v. Bragdon, 219 Mass. 170, 106 N.E. 633 (1914);
see Annot., 127 A.L.R. 132 (1940), 133 A.L.R. 1349 (1941).
s Speck v. Wylie, note 4, supra; Chapin v. Kreps, 106 N.J.L. 424, 147
Atl. 398 (1929). See Annot., 95 A.L.R. 760 (1935), 127 A.L.R. 132 (1940).
But see, Hall v. Crow, 240 Ia. 81 34 N.W.2d 195 (1948) allowing damages;
Annot., 127 A.L.R. 143 (1940).
9 Schuster v. North American Hotel Co., 106 Neb. 672, 186 N.W. 87 (1921).
10 3 Williston, Contracts, § 811-A (Rev. ed. 1936); and see Schuster v.
North. American Hotel Co., 106 Neb. 672, 186 N.W. 87 (1921).
11 Restatement, Agency, § 260 (1), (2) (1933); and see cases note 8.
12 J.I. Case Co. v. Bird, 51 Idaho 725, 11 P2d 966 ( 1932).
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the clause did not restrict representations, but only "Understandings and Agreements." Thus, the alleged fraudulent representations of the agent should not have been protected by the stated
clause, and recission should have been permitted.
Philip C. Sorensen, '59

